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BOOK REVIEW
Workers' Compensation: Foundations for Reform
EDITED BY MORLEY GUNDERSON & DOUGLAS HYATT
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) 336 pages.'

This book presents ten essays by eleven authors, most of them
relatively new to workers' compensation. From backgrounds in other
subjects, they bring some interesting insights; but some authors have
difficulty in distinguishing recent developments from perennial
phenomena.2 There are also many mistakes that would not have been made
if the authors had longer exposure to the subject
Several chapters compare workers' compensation in Canada vth
systems in the United States. It is unclear why. Since workers'
compensation in Canada is a species of social insurance, the United States
is not among the countries from which we are most likely to learn anything
constructive.
Chapter one summarizes the other chapters. Chapter two discusses
"the changing world of work." The chapter has a flowing style that includes
several propositions in one sentence. This tends to distract the reader, and
may have distracted the writer, from considering the accuracy of each. The
chapter is replete with non sequiturs! Much of the discussion is also of
unknown significance because of the lack of source citation, or connection
with any knovm evidence.
The chapter explains some of the difficulties of moving to reliance
on rehabilitation as a substitute for compensation at a time when the
pressures from "free trade" make rehabilitation more difficult.

I[hereinafter Foundations].
2See, for example,ibid. at 3S,where latency periodsand the difficultiesof e-tabhshingthe etitolgy
of disease are referred to as recent comple.ties.
3 See, for example, ibid. at 45: the author seems unavare that dtseas from expasure to
toxic
substances have been compensable for decades; ibd,at 307: itis stated that in Ontario prior to 1935,
claims for back injureswere "always denied;" ibid. at 303: it isstated that Ontario was the first Canadian
jurisdiction to publish workers' compensation decisions; and, biA at 355: itis indicated that the
statutory bar to civil liability precludes actions for defamation byworkers against their employers.
4 See, for e.,ample, ibU at 32: "Job classifications are becoming broader, so that vorkers do a
wider range of tasks- ;" and, ibU at 39: "Pressures to contain costs in the T-tem obviously lead to a
focus on the prevention of the problem as a potential cost-effectiwe solution that also has humane
consequences."
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Chapter three deals with multiple etiology. It is well written, and
generally excellent; though the introductory page does not inspire
confidence. For example, "We are beginning to understand that disease is
multifactorial, emanating from a multitude of possible causes, including
work."' Some people may be beginning to understand this; but with regard
to diseases for which the statement is true, the multi-factorial etiology of
disease has been understood for a century by others.
One focus of this chapter is heart attacks. Based on a synthesis of
the evidence, the authors make many interesting points. For example,
"occupational status is a greater risk predictor of dying from heart disease
than any of the conventional lifestyle risk factors., 6 Also, individual
behaviour plays only a minor role in the etiology of disease, and workplace
health programs will not succeed to any large extent if the emphasis is on
behavioural modification. 7 The chapter explains why the bulk of disabilities
from diseases caused by occupation are not compensated. It concludes with
a mention of some possible system changes; but the strength of the chapter
lies in its discussion of the etiology of disease.
Chapter four focuses on bad backs. How to deal with bad back
claims has been the greatest dilemma and the greatest cause of complaint
in workers' compensation since the early years. Over the last century, a
body of knowledge has evolved about low back pain, particularly in the
context of compensation. This well-written chapter presents that
knowledge, refined by the studies of more recent years to which the author
refers. For example, it is said that most compensation systems do not have
a process in place to curtail the payment of medical aid for healthcare
interventions that have been demonstrated to be useless or worse.8 It could
have been useful to include a review of what the boards actually do
nowadays in the control of treatment. Historically, the prevention of
unnecessary and dangerous operations for low back pain has probably been
the greatest achievement of compensation board doctors.
The chapter recognizes one of the dilemmas with bad backs. Most
bad backs will resolve within about a month regardless of any attention.
Therefore it is not worth the substantial allocation of resources that would

5ibd. at 58.
6Ib6 at 65.
7Ibid. at 70.
8

Ibid. at 101.
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be required to achieve precision in diagnosis, to prescribe the optimum
treatment, and to determine the suitability of modified work. After about
a month, the cases that need such attention become apparent; but the
prospect of successful rehabilitation in these cases is undermined by the
fact that they did not receive that kind of attention in the first place. A
useful supplement to this chapter could be a historical review of the
measures that compensation boards have adopted in the past to resolve this
dilemma. The author suggests that modified work could be selected by an
exchange of forms between physicians and management people at the place
of employment, 9 but any adoption of that suggestion would be counterproductive.
Chapter five deals with the effects of workers' compensation and
other payroll taxes on the macro economies of Canada and Ontario. It
explains how "the immediate short-run incidence of a payroll tax change
falls on employers, but ...
all or most of the eventual long-run incidence
falls on employees ... ."' Given that workers' compensation assessments
are fairly stable, with changes in the rates usually being marginal, this
means that most of the cost of assessments is borne by labour. Any increase
inassessments will tend to dampen demand, and therefore employment,
though only marginally, and only in the short-run. The chapter includes
some models, that have partly theoretical and partly empirical bases, in a
gallant effort to estimate the impact of workers' compensation on rates of
employment. The extent to which these models illustrate reality is
uncertain.
Further, the chapter does not discuss the most significant positive
influence of workers' compensation on job creation; i.e., the use to which
the assessments are put. Workers' compensation is,
for the most part, a
system in which income is redistributed from people who are working to
people who have a compensable disability. Given that the average income
of the former group is higher than the average income of the latter, one
would expect that the working group might save some portion of its income,
while those on compensation need to spend all that they receive. It is surely
a credible hypothesis that this redistribution of income tends to increase
demand, and thereby increase jobs. If this is correct, it would mean that any
negative influence of workers' compensation on jobs is temporary and

IbaL at I11.
10Ibi at 120, but see ibi at 124. where the author appreciates the difficulty of hating this
recognized on the political scene.
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marginal, while the positive influence not only offsets that negative
influence, but also extends to the ongoing total assessments.
Chapter six deals with unfunded liabilities. The opening paragraph
asserts that unfunded liabilities need to be addressed in one of the ways
that the authors mention; but it is not really explained why. In particular,
the chapter does not distinguish between: (a) an unfunded liability that
results from a recalculation of reserve requirements following a rise in
interest rates in a jurisdiction in which benefits are fully indexed; and, (b)
an unfunded liability that results from persistent deficits in annual
operating accounts. The former will be self-correcting when interest rates
fall. The latter may well need to be addressed.
The chapter sets out the arguments in support of full-funding, but
not the arguments in support of current cost financing. Nor does it set out
the arguments in favour of the position recommended in the Meredith
Report, and which became the traditional position in Ontario; ie., partial
funding. A possible explanation is that the chapter concentrates on the
arguments derived from abstract economic theory. It does not canvass the
arguments that might be derived from pragmatic, political, or social policy
considerations, or from real economic considerations.
A surprising absence from a chapter on unfunded liabilities is any
discussion of the merits of the annual recalculation of the adequacy of
reserves. This annual recalculation has significant implications.
The chapter includes the usual contemporary expression of concern
about the aging population; as if the problems confronting us were
problems of wealth creation, or inter-generational distribution.
Chapter seven deals with occupational health and safety. The
opening paragraph refers to "market failures," as if markets would protect
the health and safety of workers if only they did not fail. Rather than
beginning with market theory and then allowing for failure, it would be
more realistic to recognize that it is not in the nature of markets to protect
non-market values, including the health and safety of workers. Indeed,
markets often create an economic pressure to take risks with other peoples'
lives (and sometimes also with one's own).
The goal of the chapter is to summarize the empirical evidence on
the effectiveness, in the promotion of occupational health and safety, of
experience rating compared with regulatory regimes. A portion of the
chapter relates to each area. There is a striking contrast between the two
portions in the use of statistics. The portion on regulatory regimes reads
like a review of articles mostly written by people who work in offices, taking
published statistics at face value, analysing data of unknown credibility and
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unknown comparability, and then relying almost exclusively on those data
to reach conclusions. Sophistication in the mathematical phase of statistical
analysis can be an instrument of misinformation if the prerequisites for data
validity have not been met, and the language of the chapter leaves doubt
that they were.
There is no mention in this portion of the chapter that the data
relied upon were screened to ensure that they had been gathered according
to acceptable standards of scholarly rigour. There is no mention of the
researchers having undertaken the fieldwork required to check for bias and
other aspects of credibility and comparability at data sources; or that when
verbal inputs were being coded, the researchers sat with the coding clerks
to see how this was being done; or that other comparability checks were
made. Also, it does not appear that care was taken to ensure that data were
correctly labelled. If data relating to one thing are being used as a proxy for
something else, the data should still be labelled as what they are.
Otherwise, the ordinary reader is being misled, and even the sophisticated
reader is distracted from considering the validity of the proxy. In particular,
if claims statistics are being used as a proxy for the occurrence of injuries
or diseases, they should still be called claims statistics.
Confidence in data validity in the regulatory portion of the chapter
is undermined by the references to aggregated "injury rates." There is no
such thing as aggregated "injury rates." There are only aggregated claims
data, and they can be very misleading as a proxy for comparative injury
rates. Consider the example of a regulatory agency that had unqualified
staff, and that was totally lethargic, performing its functions like rituals
without purpose. Suppose that it was suddenly upgraded to have qualified
staff, enthusiastically performing their duties, and guided by a sense of
purpose. One would surely expect two consequences to follow: (1) an
increase in the proportion of occupational disabilities that are reported as
claims; and, (2) a decrease in the occurrence of occupational disabilities.
Using claims data to measure the significance of the change in the agency
would be absurd. Claims data are conditioned by both the occurrence of
disabilities and the incentives and disincentives to reporting. Yet this
portion of the chapter appears to rely on studies that have used claims data
as a proxy for the occurrence of disabilities. In that way, it concludes that
regulation has a beneficial effect in reducing certain types of injuries, but
does not affect the (non-existent) "global injury rate."
When the author referred to "plant-level data," a different
conclusion emerged. "[A] plant that is inspected and penalized in any given
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year will record a 22 per cent reduction in lost-workday injuries in the
following three-year period.""
The portion of the chapter that deals with experience rating
recognizes these problems in the use of statistics, particularly the problem
of using claims data as a proxy for occurrence data. This portion of the
chapter recognizes that experience rating causes under-reporting of
occupational disabilities.
The chapter concludes "that economic or market incentives through
experience rating of workers' compensation have a more pronounced effect
on improving workplace health and safety, since employers have a
monetary incentive to reduce accidents and hence their premiums." 2 That
proclamation of faith accords with the political pressures of the age, but it
is not supported by evidence presented in the chapter. Indeed, the author
had earlier recognized that "[a]n empirical linkage between experience
rating and workplace safety has proved to be elusive."' 3
Chapter eight discusses whether workers' compensation in Canada
should be administered by insurance companies. It is unclear why that
question should be reopened. That question was considered in the Meredith
Report 4 and answered in the negative. Unions, employers and the
Commission recognized that insurance companies were part of the
problem, and administration by a government agency was chosen for valid
reasons. Nothing of any relevance has since changed, except that a few
American insurance companies have been aggressive in recent years in
pursuing workers' compensation in Canada as a profit opportunity. This has
been facilitated by the revival and elevation of simplistic market theory,
resulting from the political ascendancy of the Chicago School.
Market theory is portrayed in the chapter as if it should be the
paramount determinant of public policy, rather than (as it used to be seen)
simply one perspective to be considered among others, including public
health, stability, family life, the prevention of crime, and the promotion of
small business, as well as social and individual justice. The almost exclusive

11
12

Ibid.at 191.
Ibid. at 213.

13 Ibid.at 203.
14 W.R. Meredith, Final Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers to Make
Compensation to Their Employeesfor InjuriesReceived in the Course of Their Employment Which Are in
Forcein OtherCountries,andasto How FarSuch LawsAre Foundto Work Satisfactorily (Toronto: King's
Printer, 1913).
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focus on market theory leads to the expected conclusion that, "in theory,
public-sector enterprises are likely to be less efficient and less innovative
than their private-sector equivalent."' s It is not adequately explained how
a workers' compensation board and an insurance company can be
considered equivalent.
The chapter recognizes some of the limitations of insurance
companies in this context; for example, that the employer selects the
insurer while the workers are the consumers."b It also recognizes the risk of
health care costs being externalized to the health care system." More could
be mentioned, however, on this theme. Insurance companies would have
a greater economic incentive to externalize costs in a myriad of ways. In
workers' compensation, the externalized costs can include costs borne
directly by employers through their participation in claims processing, costs
borne by workers in legal fees and in other aspects of claims processing, the
costs to unions, costs to workers and to the public through therapeutic
damage caused by claims processing, wage loss and other costs to the
spouses of disabled workers, and the off-loading of costs, not only onto the
health care system, but also onto welfare and legal aid.
The chapter does not mention several of the advantages of a state
monopoly. For example, if the total claims volume was divided among
several insurers, it would be more difficult to decentralize claims
administration and adjudication. So this method of minimizing the
frequency of mistakes and injustices would be lost or curtailed.
The chapter tries to compare the relative efficiency of workers'
compensation in Canada and in the United States, and it recognizes some
of the difficulties in doing so. On this point, the chapter states that "A
legitimate measure of the effectiveness of WC might be seen in the
minimization of claims costs subject to some confidence that claims were
being dealt with reasonably and fairly."'" The chapter does not say how that
confidence could be obtained or measured, or how the economic incentive
that insurance companies would have to frustrate justice according to law
would be negated. The chapter mentions appeal systems, but they can be

15 Foundations,supra note I at 240.
16
17
18

Ibid at 200.
Ibid at 230.
bi at 232.
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(and often have been) a way of greasing squeaky wheels while leaving
injustice and ineptitude to prevail in primary decisions.
The chapter advocates allowing insurance companies to compete
with the compensation boards. It recognizes that this could be a mistake,
but "[ilf the problems cannot be resolved, then private entry would be
rolled back."19 The chapter does not explain how the political pressures
against assessing the problems would be overcome. Nor does it estimate the
harm from several years of turmoil while the "privatization" takes place,
and is then "rolled back." There is also no mention of whether such reversal
would be politically feasible, or even whether it would be legally possible
under "free trade" in services.
Chapter nine attempts to compare the cost of workers'
compensation in Ontario, British Columbia, and the United States. Cost
comparisons of this type are notoriously difficult, and the authors advert to
some of the problems. The first requirement in any cost comparison is
product identification. The authors seek to cope with this by reducing
benefit structures to a common unit of benefit. This is only possible for the
countable benefits. There is no comparison of the non-countable benefits
(such as courtesy in dealing with claimants so as to alleviate anxiety) or with
externalized benefits (such as impacts of the system on the spouses of
claimants). Also, the chapter only compares the benefits that workers are
supposed to receive.' It does not compare the benefits that workers do
receive. This makes it difficult to compare discretionary benefits. The
authors try gallantly to control for extraneous variables, but one is not left
with a confidence that they have succeeded in achieving a valid comparison
of the benefits.
Even greater problems lie on the cost side. The authors compare
only costs as they appear in the books of the administering agencies. As
mentioned above, insurance companies have a greater economic incentive
to externalize costs than does a government agency. The level of
externalized costs is not readily measurable, but it is likely to be high.
Subject to some caveats, the authors conclude that "workers'
compensation programs in Canada, and the British Columbia program in
particular, enjoy a relative cost advantage when compared to those in the
United States." If externalized costs had been included in the comparison,

19

Ibid. at 256-57,

20 Ibid. at 276-80.
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the apparent advantage of the Canadian systems would almost certainly
have been much greater.
Chapter ten provides an excellent experience-based explanation of
why workers' compensation in Ontario has become more adversarial of
over the last twenty years. Changes that the author suggests have made the
system more adversarial include: the creation of an external appeals
tribunal; the widespread expansion of experience rating (which the author
describes as "[a]rguably the greatest single change in the Ontario system
commencing in the 1980s ...
."); free representation of workers and
employers; decentralization without adequate care in staff selection and
quality control; older worker supplements; the abolition of physical
impairment pensions for permanent disability and the substitution of
benefits that require more decisions per claim; the introduction of
compulsory rehabilitation; and the inadequacy of the Board's adjudicative
manuals (though the manuals in Ontario have always been a problem). The
explosion of controversies was a predictable and predicted consequence of
the changes mentioned. The author shows a familiarity with the working
realities of the system, and provides some penetrating insights.
Chapter eleven deals with the relationship of tort liability to
workers' compensation. Some of the comments illustrate the bizarre
extremities of economic theory; for example, the suggestion that prior to
workers' compensation, the limitations on tort liability created over-saving
among workers. ' Other comments are perceptive and credible, such as the
comment on the publicity that Ontario has given to the prosecution of
fraud. "While no-one would condone fraud, making this the central publicrelations sphere of the system appears to have a chilling effect upon all
claimants, and to undermine public respect for the institution of public
insurance against workplace injuries."3
The authors refer to experience rating as driving "straight at the
heart of the original 'bargain' that was struck between labour and capital
over the formation of the WC system-a bargain that was intended to save
both sides from the cost, torment, and unpredictability of litigation."'

21 Ibid at 309.
22Ibid. at 331.
23 Ib.

at 337.
24 IbI- at 33S.
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A common assumption in the legal profession is that for cases in
which a tort claim would succeed, tort liability generally pays more than
workers' compensation. This chapter discredits that assumption. It
reinforces the point that when a claimant has an election, an advising
lawyer should do the arithmetic on the facts of the case before advising the
client under which system to claim.
The authors suggest that tort claims should be allowed to survive
the statutory bar if they are for "intentional torts." The misnomer
"intentional torts" infiltrated legal education in Canada about thirty-five
years ago, and has caused confusion ever since. For cases of disability
alleged to result from some fault of the employer, acceptance of this
proposal could divert enormous resources to metaphysical debate about
whether a particular fault was an "intentional tort" or negligence.
A more limited but also more workable idea might be to clarify that
the statutory bar does not preclude an award of restitution by a criminal
court on a successful prosecution under the Criminal Code.
A shortcoming of the book is that the advocacy of change is not
usually balanced by recognition of the countervailing value of system
stability. Parts of the book include ill-considered suggestions for change,
and would tend to aggravate the propensity of the contemporary political
process to make changes without the implications of those changes being
considered. Other parts, however, militate against that risk; and chapter ten
shows one type of damage resulting from ill-considered changes made in
Ontario over the last twenty years.
The book does not provide "foundations for reform," but it does
include some interesting contributions on the design of workers'
compensation. In particular, chapters three, five and ten are valuable
additions to the literature.
Terence G. Ison, LL.D.
Barrister & Solicitor
Professor Emeritus
Osgoode Hall Law School

